🤖 AI Summary
This study systematically identifies a critical challenge in vulnerability disclosure: low PoC availability in the wild—78.9% of CVEs lack publicly available PoCs, existing reports on average omit 30% of essential reproduction information, and reproducibility failure rates remain high. To address this, we construct the largest empirical PoC dataset to date, comprising 470,000 PoCs. We propose a fine-grained component extraction method and adapt a fine-tuned BERT-NER model to quantitatively assess report completeness. Further, we design a comprehensive evaluation framework integrating multi-platform automated collection with manual reproduction experiments. Our analysis identifies key usability barriers—including ambiguous environment dependencies and missing trigger conditions—and derives actionable, implementable strategies to enhance PoC quality. The work establishes a foundational dataset and methodological framework to support collaborative vulnerability response and automated exploit validation.
📝 Abstract
The Proof-of-Concept (PoC) for a vulnerability is crucial in validating its existence, mitigating false positives, and illustrating the severity of the security threat it poses. However, research on PoCs significantly lags behind studies focusing on vulnerability data. This discrepancy can be directly attributed to several challenges, including the dispersion of real-world PoCs across multiple platforms, the diversity in writing styles, and the difficulty associated with PoC reproduction. To fill this gap, we conduct the first large-scale study on PoCs in the wild, assessing their report availability, completeness, reproducibility. Specifically, 1) to investigate PoC reports availability for CVE vulnerability, we collected an extensive dataset of 470,921 PoCs and their reports from 13 platforms, representing the broadest collection of publicly available PoCs to date. 2) To assess the completeness of PoC report at a fine-grained level, we proposed a component extraction method, which combines pattern-matching techniques with a fine-tuned BERT-NER model to extract 9 key components from PoC reports. 3) To evaluate the effectiveness of PoCs, we recruited 8 participants to manually reproduce 150 sampled vulnerabilities with 32 vulnerability types based on PoC reports, enabling an in-depth analysis of PoC reproducibility and the factors influencing it. Our findings reveal that 78.9% of CVE vulnerabilities lack available PoCs, and existing PoC reports typically miss about 30% of the essential components required for effective vulnerability understanding and reproduction, with various reasons identified for the failure to reproduce vulnerabilities using available PoC reports. Finally, we proposed actionable strategies for stakeholders to enhance the overall usability of vulnerability PoCs in strengthening software security.