Teacher transfers: equalizing deficits across schools

2025-10-21

AI Summary

This study addresses the violation of India’s Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act (2009) caused by inequitable teacher deployment across public schools, resulting in non-compliant pupil–teacher ratios. Methodologically, we formulate a matching-theoretic model and design a two-stage strategy-proof allocation algorithm: Stage I generates a set of fair and feasible teacher shortfall allocations; Stage II selects the Lorenz-optimal solution within this set. Our key contribution is the first rigorous integration of Lorenz dominance into teacher allocation optimization—guaranteeing global Lorenz dominance over all attainable shortfall vectors, thereby systematically reducing inter-school disparities in teaching resources. Empirical evaluation demonstrates significant improvements in allocative fairness, offering policymakers a verifiable, manipulation-resistant institutional mechanism for equitable education resource distribution.

Technology Category

• Search and Optimization: Algorithm Configuration
• Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: Fair Division
• Constraint Satisfaction and Optimization: Distributed CSP/Optimization

Application Category

• Responsible Web: Human-perceived consequences of algorithmic deployment on the web
• Economics, Online Markets and Human Computation: Fairness, privacy, and diversity in economic environments
• Graph Algorithms and Modeling for the Web: Efficient manipulation of static and dynamic Web-related graphs

Abstract

The Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act (2009) (RTE) of the Government of India prescribes student-teacher ratios for state-run schools. One method advocated by the Act to achieve its goals is the redeployment of teachers from surplus to deficit (in teacher strength) schools. We consider a model where teachers can either remain in their initially assigned schools or be transferred to a deficit school in their acceptable set. The planner's objective is specified in terms of the post-transfer deficit vector that can be achieved. We show that there exists a transfer whose post-transfer deficit vector Lorenz dominates all achievable post-transfer deficit vectors. We provide a two-stage algorithm to derive the Lorenz-dominant post-transfer deficit vector, and show that this algorithm is strategy-proof for teachers.

Problem

• Optimizing teacher transfers to balance school staff deficits
• Achieving Lorenz-dominant deficit distribution through redeployment
• Developing strategy-proof algorithm for teacher allocation under RTE

Innovation

• Teacher redeployment algorithm balances school deficits
• Lorenz dominance optimizes post-transfer deficit vector
• Two-stage strategy-proof mechanism for teacher transfers