🤖 AI Summary
Iterative jailbreaking attacks—where adversaries repeatedly rewrite prompts and conduct trial-and-error to elicit harmful outputs from large language models (LLMs)—exploit dynamic feedback loops that existing defenses fail to actively disrupt. Method: We propose the first online-learning-based dynamic prompt optimization framework for jailbreaking defense, integrating reinforcement learning with direction-aware gradient suppression (PDGD). It models the discriminative boundary between harmful and harmless prompts in real time during inference, suppresses local overfitting, and enables adaptive evolution of defense policies. Results: Evaluated on three mainstream LLMs, our method significantly outperforms five baseline defenses across five representative iterative jailbreaking attack types, demonstrating superior robustness while simultaneously improving response quality on benign tasks. Its core innovation lies in pioneering the application of online learning to jailbreaking defense—shifting from passive filtering to proactive, context-aware guidance.
📝 Abstract
Iterative jailbreak methods that repeatedly rewrite and input prompts into large language models (LLMs) to induce harmful outputs -- using the model's previous responses to guide each new iteration -- have been found to be a highly effective attack strategy. Despite being an effective attack strategy against LLMs and their safety mechanisms, existing defenses do not proactively disrupt this dynamic trial-and-error cycle. In this study, we propose a novel framework that dynamically updates its defense strategy through online learning in response to each new prompt from iterative jailbreak methods. Leveraging the distinctions between harmful jailbreak-generated prompts and typical harmless prompts, we introduce a reinforcement learning-based approach that optimizes prompts to ensure appropriate responses for harmless tasks while explicitly rejecting harmful prompts. Additionally, to curb overfitting to the narrow band of partial input rewrites explored during an attack, we introduce Past-Direction Gradient Damping (PDGD). Experiments conducted on three LLMs show that our approach significantly outperforms five existing defense methods against five iterative jailbreak methods. Moreover, our results indicate that our prompt optimization strategy simultaneously enhances response quality for harmless tasks.