Cognitive Constructivism and the Epistemic Significance of Sharp Statistical Hypotheses in Natural Sciences
Traditional Bayesian paradigms neglect the ontological status of sharp statistical hypotheses, undermining their cognitive significance in natural science. Method: This study develops an epistemological framework aligned with cognitive constructivism, centering on the notion of “intrinsic solutions” to formalize the cognitive reality of sharp hypotheses. It introduces four criteria—sharpness, stability, separability, and composability—to assess their cognitive objectivity and grounds inference in the Full Bayesian Significance Test (FBST), moving beyond decision-theoretic Bayesian hypothesis testing. Contribution/Results: The work establishes the first operational, empirically verifiable constructivist statistical inference system, integrating FBST, subjectivist Bayesian modeling, formalized separability, and stability sensitivity analysis. It provides a novel, rigorous metric for evaluating the cognitive value of scientific hypotheses, thereby advancing both epistemology and statistical methodology.