Coordinated incentives in AI-generated misinformation governance
This study addresses the escalating spread of misinformation fueled by the proliferation of AI-generated content, which undermines information credibility and societal trust. To analyze this challenge, the authors construct an evolutionary game-theoretic model involving three key stakeholders—government regulators, AI firms, and users—and incorporate heterogeneous reward-punishment mechanisms. By employing replicator dynamics, they examine strategic interactions among these agents. The findings reveal that neither regulatory oversight nor market-based incentives alone suffice to curb misinformation effectively. Instead, an evolutionarily stable equilibrium favoring truthful content production emerges only when coordinated incentives align such that regulatory intensity, reputational penalties for noncompliance, and user-level rewards jointly exceed critical thresholds. This work thus provides a theoretical foundation and identifies essential parameter conditions for the collaborative governance of AI-driven misinformation.