Longitudinal Relational Publics and their Discursive Overlap with Issue Publics
研究通过引入纵向关系网络公共概念，分析了非政治性在线空间中的政治讨论现象及其受众特征，以了解谁在何时将政治议题带入这些空间。
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The No-show Paradox in Single Transferable Vote under One-dimensional Preferences
This study investigates the Group No-Show Paradox (GNSP) under Single Transferable Vote (STV)—a phenomenon wherein the abstention of a subset of voters results in an outcome more preferred by the remaining electorate—within widely adopted one-dimensional preference domains, including 1D-Euclidean, single-peaked, and single-crossing structures. Through theoretical analysis and synthetic data experiments, the work demonstrates for the first time that STV is highly susceptible to GNSP in these settings, with paradox occurrence significantly amplified when voters holding extreme positions abstain and escalating sharply as the number of candidates increases. In contrast, Condorcet-consistent rules exhibit no such vulnerability under identical conditions. The study further establishes verifiable sufficient conditions for GNSP to arise, underscoring the inherent instability of STV in one-dimensional preference environments.
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Longitudinal Relational Publics and their Discursive Overlap with Issue Publics
研究通过引入纵向关系网络公共概念，分析了非政治性在线空间中的政治讨论现象及其受众特征，以了解谁在何时将政治议题带入这些空间。
0 citationsRead paper
The No-show Paradox in Single Transferable Vote under One-dimensional Preferences
This study investigates the Group No-Show Paradox (GNSP) under Single Transferable Vote (STV)—a phenomenon wherein the abstention of a subset of voters results in an outcome more preferred by the remaining electorate—within widely adopted one-dimensional preference domains, including 1D-Euclidean, single-peaked, and single-crossing structures. Through theoretical analysis and synthetic data experiments, the work demonstrates for the first time that STV is highly susceptible to GNSP in these settings, with paradox occurrence significantly amplified when voters holding extreme positions abstain and escalating sharply as the number of candidates increases. In contrast, Condorcet-consistent rules exhibit no such vulnerability under identical conditions. The study further establishes verifiable sufficient conditions for GNSP to arise, underscoring the inherent instability of STV in one-dimensional preference environments.
0 citationsRead paper