Stealing Reasoning Traces from Proprietary LLM APIs
This work systematically uncovers a critical compatibility vulnerability in encrypted reasoning chains employed by large language model (LLM) providers to safeguard intellectual property. Despite encryption, reasoning blocks exhibit cross-session, cross-user, and cross-model interoperability flaws. The authors propose a novel decryption-based jailbreaking technique that leverages reverse engineering and cross-model reasoning block injection: by exploiting weaker models to decrypt the encrypted inference traces of stronger ones, the method reconstructs full reasoning processes without direct attacks. Empirical evaluation demonstrates successful extraction of reasoning chains from models by Anthropic, OpenAI, and Google, decrypting 315,320 publicly logged blocks, recovering 367 personally identifiable information (PII) instances and 182 credential sets, and enabling stealthy prompt injection that effectively bypasses existing anti-distillation and security mechanisms.